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"As PERFECT AS CAN BE DEVISED": I
DEROLPH V. STATE OF OHIO AND THE RIGHT TO
EDUCATION IN OHIO
It's time for results. It's time to get something out of our
money... They have to do what everybody else has to
do. They have to restructure.
GOVERNOR GEORGE VOINOVICH2
I would invite the governor and his staff to visit some of
these districts and show them how to get more for the
buck .... He would find kids going to school without
bathrooms. He would find kids going to school in coal
bins.
WILLIAM L PHILLIS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE OHIO
COALMON FOR EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN SCHOOL FUNDING
3
In DeRolph v. State of Ohio,4 the Perry County Common Pleas
Court held that Ohio's current system of funding public elementary
and secondary education through local property taxes violates the
Ohio Constitution.5 The court based its holding on two major
grounds.. First, the court found that the inequities visited upon poor
school districts by the current funding system deprive students of
I. II REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE
REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO, 698 (J.V. Smith ed., 1851)
[hereinafter DEBATES OF 1851 CONVENTION] (statement of Delegate Archbold concerning
the meaning of a "thorough and efficient system of common schools").
2. Vindu P. Goel, Voinovich Assails Schools Over Lawsuit, CLEVELAND PLAIN
DEALER, July 7, 1994, at 5B (criticizing school districts for not "doing more with less"
after the issuance of the DeRolph opinion).
3. Id.
4. DeRolph v. State of Ohio, No. 22043, (Perry County, July 1. 1994) (copy available
at cost from the Ohio Coalition for Equity and Adequacy in School Funding, I00 South
Third Street, Columbus, OH 43215).
5. Id. at 463.
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their fundamental right to education, guaranteed by the Ohio
Constitution, and so deny them the equal protection of the law.
Second, the court held that the State, by not remedying these
inequities, has failed to fulfill its constitutional duty to "secure a
thorough and efficient system of common schools" throughout the
state of Ohio.7
Brought by the Ohio Coalition for Equity and Adequacy of
School Funding on behalf of 500 of the 748 school districts in
Ohio,' DeRolph represented a concerted state-wide effort to
6. Id. at 469. The Court grounds the fundamental right to education in article I,
section 1 and section 7 of the Ohio Constitution. Article I, section 1 states that:
All men are, by nature, free and independent, and have certain inalienable
rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty,
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and seeking and obtaining
happiness and safety.
OHIO CONST. art. I, § I.
Article I, section 7 states, in pertinent part, that:
... Religion, morality, and knowledge, however, being essential to good
government, it shall be the duty of the general assembly to pass suitable laws
to protect every religious denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its own
mode of public worship, and to encourage schools and the means of
instruction.
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 7.
Article I, section 2, from which the Court the guarantee of equal protection, states that:
All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their
equal protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter, reform, or abolish
the same, whenever they may deem it necessary; and no special privileges or
immunities shall ever be granted, that may not be altered, revoked, or repealed
by the general assembly.
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 2.
The Court also held that the current funding system violated OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3323.02, (Baldwin 1990), by not providing handicapped students with an appropriate
education, as required by the statute. As such, the Court held that this violation deprived
handicapped students in poor districts of the article II, section 26 requirement of the
"uniform operation of the laws." OHIO CONST. art. II, § 26. This Comment will focus
only on how this holding relates to the broader equal protection claim.
7. DeRolph v. State of Ohio, No. 22043, (Perry County, July 1, 1994) at 475. Article
VI, section 2 of the Ohio Constitution states that:
The general assembly shall make such provisions, by taxation, or otherwise, as,
with the income arising from the school trust fund, will secure a thorough and
efficient system of common schools throughout the state; but no religious or
other sect or sects, shall ever have any exclusive right to, or control of, any
part of the school funds of this state.
OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2.
8. Tim Miller, Court Voids System; Ohio School Funding Unconstitutional, DAYTON
DAILY NEWS, July 2, 1994, at IA.
[Vol. 45:679
19951 DeROLPH V. STATE OF OHIO 681
overturn Ohio's property-based school funding system. The
voluminous trial record9  demonstrated the plaintiffs"'  well-
organized challenge and the defendant's" equal resolve in
defending against it. Although Judge Linton D. Lewis, Jr.'s opinion
represents a complete victory for the plaintiffs, this opinion merely
constitutes "the first act in a three-act drama that will not conclude
until the Ohio Supreme Court rules."' 2
This Comment will address the strength of DeRolph's
constitutional holdings. Part I will discuss Board of Education v.
Walter,3 a 1979 case in which the state funding system then in
effect, the guaranteed yield 4  formula, withstood a similar
constitutional challenge. 5 Part II will briefly describe the current
funding system and set forth in detail the DeRolph court's essential
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 6 Part III will then
examine: 1) Walter's precedential effect on DeRolph; 7 2) the
validity of the equal protection holding, 8 and 3) the validity of
the "thorough and efficient" holding.' 9
I. BOARD OF EDUCATION V. WALTER
In Board of Education v. Walter, the named plaintiffs were the
Board of Education, Superintendent, Clerk-Treasurer, students, and
9. With 71 witnesses and 500 exhibits, the total trial record came to 10,827 pages.
DeRolph at 463.
10. Plaintiffs included three rural and two urban boards of education. The rural districts
were Northern Local School District (Perry County), Southern Local School District (Perry
County), and Dawson-Bryant Local School District (Lawrence County). The urban districts
were Lima City School District and Youngstown City School District. Plaintiffs also
included superintendents, board members, teachers, parents, and children of these districts.
Id. (cover page).
11. Defendants were the State of Ohio, the State Board of Education, the Ohio
Department of Education, and Dr. Ted Sanders, in his individual capacity as the Ohio
Superintendent of Public Instruction. Id. After the DeRolph decision, the State Board of
Education voted 6-5 not to appeal. The State, however, did appeal and joined the State
Board of Education, along with the Ohio Department of Education, as defendants. The
plaintiffs planned to challenge the forcible joinder of these parties on appeal. Jonathan
Riskind, State to Appeal School Funding Ruling, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, August 13, 1994,
at IC.
12. Miller, supra note 8 (quoting State Senate President Stanley Aronoff).
13. 58 Ohio St. 2d 368 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015" (1980).
14. See infra note 21.
15. See infra notes 20-59 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 60-106 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 107-15 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 116-49 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 150-71 and accompanying text.
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parents of the financially-strapped Cincinnati School District.'°
They filed a class action on behalf of all other school districts
similarly situated seeking a judgment declaring the guaranteed yield
school funding formula2' unconstitutional under the "equal protec-
tion and benefit" clause of article I, section 2 and the "thorough
and efficient" clause of article VI, section 2 of the Ohio Constitu-
tion.2 At the trial level, the plaintiffs succeeded in both claims. 23
The court of appeals, however, upheld only the equal protection
claim.24 It reversed the trial court's "thorough and efficient"
holding, stating that the trial court "overstepped its power" by
infringing upon the General Assembly's broad authority in educa-
tional matters.'
Upon appeal of this decision, the Ohio Supreme Court held
that the guaranteed yield formula violated neither the "equal protec-
tion and benefit" clause nor the "thorough and efficient" clause.26
Although this holding seems contrary to the later DeRolph opinion,
Walter is as important for the decisions it avoided as the decisions
it made. A close examination of the Walter opinion reveals that the
court, rather than focusing on the plaintiffs' claim to a right to an
adequate education, redefined the issue as one "more directly con-
cerned with the way in which Ohio has decided to collect and
spend state and local taxes."' 7 This reformulation of the case,
20. Board of Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 368 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1015 (1980).
21. The guaranteed yield formula operated as follows. First, the local districts were re-
quired to levy a tax of at least 20 mills per dollar of taxable property valuation. The
state would then guarantee each district funds sufficient to achieve a minimum property
tax base of $48,000 per pupil, which results in a minimum guarantee of $960 per pupil
($48,000 x 20 mills). The state would also give districts a bonus for extra local millage
between 20 and 30 mills. For a more detailed description of this formula see Robert J.
Davidek, Note, The School Funding Challenge in Ohio: Board of Education v. Walter, 11
U. TOL. L. REV. 1019, 1019 n.2 (1980). For a thorough description of the deficiencies of
this system see Annette B. Johnson, State Court Intervention in School Finance Reform,
28 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 325, 361 (1979).
22. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d at 369.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 380.
26. Id. at 368.
27. Board of Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 375-76 (1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1015 (1980). For further commentary on the Walter court's redefinition of the issue
see Jeffrey L. Hayman, Comment, Equal Educational Opportunity and Public School Fi-
nance Reform in Ohio: Board of Education v. Walter, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 179, 202 (1980)
(characterizing the court's opinion as an evasion of the issue of equal educational opportu-
nity); Geoffrey W. Veith, Recent Case, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 1126 (1979) (stating that the
[Vol. 45:679
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along with some nifty manipulation of the facts,28 allowed the
court to avoid the issues DeRolph presented.
In deciding the equal protection claim, the Walter court adopt-
ed the traditional two-tiered equal protection analysis employed by
the United States Supreme Court is its seminal school funding
case, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.29 The
Walter Court stated that if Ohio's funding system interfered with
the exercise of a fundamental right, here the right to an adequate
education, it would be overturned unless "closely tailored" to effec-
tuate a compelling state interest.30 Conversely, if no fundamental
right were involved, the system would survive if merely "rationally
related" to a state interest.3'
However, the Ohio court declined to adopt Rodriguez's test for
determining the fundamentality of a right-namely, that the right
be "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. 32 First,
it correctly pointed out that the Ohio Constitution, unlike the Unit-
ed States Constitution, is one of plenary powers and therefore
contains provisions "not considered fundamental to the concept of
ordered liberty," like workers' compensation.3 In addition, the
court noted that the test might be too broad in any case since, "the
right to acquire and hold property" for example, "is guaranteed in
the Federal and State Constitutions [but] surely ... is not a likely
candidate" for strict scrutiny analysis.' Inexplicably though, the
court dropped its analysis of the fundamentality of a right to edu-
cation at this point. Not only did the court fail to determine wheth-
er the right to an education is fundamental, it failed to elucidate
any test for determining the fundamentality of any ri,ht under the
Ohio Constitution.
Rather than developing a standard of its own with which to
analyze the fundamentality of a right to education, the court simply
decided against strict scrutiny because the case "dealt with difficult
court redefined the issue).
28. See Veith, supra note 27, at 1131; see also Davidek, supra note 21, at 1041.
29. 411 U.S. 1, 36-7 (1973) (holding that the Texas school funding system did not
violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
30. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d at 374 (quoting Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388
(1978)).
31. Id.
32. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33.
33. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d at 374.
34. Id. (quoting Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 282 (N.J. 1973)) (finding the New
Jersey school funding system unconstitutional pursuant to its own "thorough and efficient"
constitutional provision).
68319951
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issues of taxation, fiscal planning and education policy. 35 By re-
defining the issue as one of taxation, the challenged guaranteed
yield program received the generous protection of a rational basis
analysis.36 Requiring the plaintiffs to prove the unconstitutionality
of the program beyond a reasonable doubt, the court held that the
guaranteed yield program passed constitutional muster because it
was rationally related to each school district's interest in local con-
trol.37 According to the court, the program comported with the
history of state intervention in the funding of public education
because it attempted to "ameliorate the disparity in the levels of
expenditure without destroying the virtues of local control."3
The Walter court's resolution of the article VI, section 2 claim
involved similar sleight-of-hand. In its legal analysis, the court
formulated a relatively clear test for constitutional compliance.
However, in its factual conclusions, it simply replaced the trial
court's findings of fact with facts of its own.
After first establishing jurisdiction to hear the issue,39 the
court attempted to set forth its standard for reviewing the actions
of the General Assembly under article VI, section 2. The court first
echoed the court of appeal's holding that article VI, section 2
constituted a broad grant of authority to the General Assembly
rather than an affirmative obligation and therefore, that the General
Assembly was entitled to great deference.4" However, the court
did not close the door on future judicial intervention. To elucidate
the limits of its deference, the court quoted a passage from Miller
35. Id. at 375.
36. See Hayman, supra note 27, at 202 (noting that the cases the court cites recogniz-
ing a legislature's broad discretion in taxation all "deal[] with classifications created when
the state collects taxes," not the effect of the tax on the groups to whom it is distribut-
ed).
37. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d at 377. The court defined local control as "not only the
freedom to devote more money to the education of one's children but also control over
and participation in the decision-making process as to how those local tax dollars are to
be spent." Id.
38. Id. at 380.
39. Id. at 383-84. The court first declared its power to review legislative action taken
pursuant to article VI, section 2, holding that "the doctrine of judicial review is so well
established that it is beyond cavil." Id. at 383. Then, the court held that the issue was
not a "political question," by relying on similar state court review of school funding
systems in New Jersey and Washington. Id. at 384 (citing Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d
273 (1973) and Seattle School District No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (1978)).
40. Id. at 385 (citing State ex rel. Methodist Children's Home Ass'n v. Board of Edu-
c., 105 Ohio St. 438 (1922) which states that "[w]ith the wisdom or the policy of such
legislation the court has no responsibility and no authority").
684 [Vol. 45:679
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v. Korns,4' an early school funding case:
[Article VI, section 2] ... calls for the upbuilding of a
system of schools throughout the state, and the attainment
of efficiency and thoroughness in that system is thus ex-
pressly made a purpose, not local, not municipal, but state-
wide .... A thorough system could not mean one in
which part or any number of the school districts of the
state were starved for funds. An efficient system could not
mean one in which part or any number of school districts
of the state lacked teachers, buildings, or equipment.42
Unfortunately, the court's application of this standard contra-
vened Miller's clear language. As an example of a situation in
which a system would not be "thorough and efficient," the court
cited Rodriguez's "absolute deprivation of education" standard.43
The court's factual finding that no child had been deprived of an
education because all had received the statutorily-mandated 182
days of instruction reinforces the view that the court would require
such deprivation before intervening under article VI, section 2.'
However, this interpretation plainly ignored Miller, which permitted
intervention if a school district "lacked teachers, buildings, or
equipment."4 In contrast to its own purported standard, the Walter
court seemed to require the absolute deprivation of all three.'
Most disturbingly,, the court ignored long-standing Ohio Su-
preme Court precedent by substituting its own factual findings for
41. 107 Ohio St. 287 (1923) (holding that the state had the authority to apply the
taxes collected from one school district to the funding of another, less wealthy school
district).
42. Id. at 297-98.
43. Board of Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 387 (1979) (quoting San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 25 (1973)), cert. denied 444 U.S. 1015
(1980). In suggesting this standard, the Walter Court fails to recognize the context in
which this standard arose in Rodriguez. In Rodriguez, the Court was considering an equal
protection claim in which the plaintiffs, on the basis of their poverty, asserted suspect
class status. In mentioning this standard, then, the Rodriguez Court was merely stating
well-established precedent that, in evaluating equal protection claims on the basis of pov-
erty as a suspect class, absolute deprivation of a right is required. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at
20. The language of article VI, section 2, by placing a positive obligation on the state to
provide a "thorough and efficient system of " schools, in no way resembles the language
of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor does the claim that the
legislature has a positive duty under article VI, section 2 resemble the suspect class claim
in Rodriguez.
44. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d at 388.
45. Id. at 386 (citing Miller, 107 Ohio St. at 297-98).
46. Id.
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those of the trial court.47 Although the trial court's findings estab-
lished that the guaranteed yield program did not meet the Miller
standard,48 the supreme court used a 1973 legislative report not
cited in the lower court to conclude that the funding program pro-
vided sufficient funds for school districts to meet state minimum
educational standards.49 On this basis, the court concluded that the
program did not violate the "thorough and efficient" clause of
article VI, section 2.
In sum, Board of Education v. Walter was a curious opinion.
The plaintiffs asserted that the Ohio Constitution guarantees each
child a fundamental right to an adequate education and that the
General Assembly failed to meet its constitutional duty to secure a
"thorough and efficient system of common schools."5 However,
the court decided the case without ever deciding these issues. It
failed to determine whether education was a fundamental right and
failed, as well, to establish any test of fundamentality for Ohio
constitutional provisions.5 As for the "thorough and efficient"
claim, the court set forth a standard that comported with the lan-
guage of the "thorough and efficient" clause, but decided the issue
on its own facts, not the trial court's findings.5 2 Even though the
court avoided these issues, however, it unequivocally stated that it
had the power to decide them.53
How then should one read this opinion? Perhaps the best read-
ing of Walter recognizes the court's unwillingness to prematurely
render a new funding system unconstitutional. 54 At the time, the
guaranteed yield program was regarded by many reformers as the
most advanced formula for achieving equity in school funding and
the plaintiffs challenged it in its first year.5  Additionally, the
47. The Ohio Supreme Court does not engage in fact-finding unless there is no evi-
dence in the trial record to support the trial court's factual conclusion. Gates v. Board of
Educ. of River Local Sch. Dist., 11 Ohio St. 2d 83, 86 (1967).
48. See Davidek, supra note 21, at 1041 (stating that the "Walter trial court found that
14% of the schools in Ohio had inadequate pupil-teacher ratios under law, 53% of the
schools were found to be deficient in curriculum and instruction, as least 31% of the
buildings lacked adequate classrooms, libraries, art music, or physical education facilities,
and 54% had inadequate textbooks").
49. 58 Ohio St. 2d at 372 (discussed in Veith, supra note 27, at 1130).
50. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
51. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text.
53. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d at 384.
54. See Johnson, supra note 21, at 368.
55. Id.
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court noted that the General Assembly had shown a willingness in
the past to study and reform the funding system. 6 In fact, the
guaranteed yield program itself arose from the inefficiencies of the
prior foundation program. 7 Finally, the Ohio court most likely
wanted to avoid the clashes with the legislature that would inevita-
bly follow the invalidation of the guaranteed yield program. 8 One
scholar correctly sums up the Walter decision when she writes that
although, the court was "extremely unwilling to intervene in [this]
legislative decision .... one also gets the impression that it would
act differently if things got bad enough."59
II. DEROLPH V. STATE OF OHIO
The plaintiffs in DeRolph asserted that things had gotten bad
enough. A short list of one plaintiff school district's inadequacies
offered proof for this claim. At the Dawson-Bryant School District
in rural Lawrence County, the building for grades four through
eight is heated by a coal furnace, which leaves a fine layer of dust
covering everything inside. The band practices in a former coal
bin.' On hot days during the first week of school, the Monitor
elementary school averages 94 degrees. If more than three teachers
plug in fans at the same time, the circuit breakers engage because
the wiring is so bad.6' The entire science depa'tment has pur-
chased one item, an aquarium, in the last three years. 62 Most tell-
ingly, Dawson-Bryant School District, as of 1993, had yet to meet
Ohio's 1983 minimum educational standards,63 standards which
the Department of Education itself recognizes as inadequate.'
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Davidek, supra note 21, at 1043 (stating that the California Supreme Court re-
viewed the constitutionality of three proposed funding plans and the New Jersey Supreme
Court reviewed five such plans).
59. Johnson, supra note 21, at 369.
60. DeRolph v. State of Ohio, No. 22043 (Perry County. July 1, 1994) at 169.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 258.
63. Id. at 290.
64. Id at 289. The other plaintiff school districts are equally inadequate. In the North-
ern Local School District, the Glenford Elementary School buildings are separated by State
Route 204 which runs without a stop light between them. Kindergarten, first, and second
graders must cross State Route 204 five times a day. Id. at 179. The Ohio Environmental
Protection Agency also discovered a high level of arsenic in the water well at Glenford.
Id. at 180. In the Southern Local School District, some mathematics textbooks were pub-
iished in 1975 and 1976. Id. at 260. In the Lima City School Districts, teachers must
teach classes combining several grades in order to effectively utilize the classrooms. Id. at
687
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
The acknowledged culprit' behind these deficiencies is the
state's current funding system, the school foundation program.'
The system works as follows. First, the General Assembly deter-
mines the basic aid level necessary to guarantee a student a mini-
mum level of education. 7 Then, the state adjusts this level from 0
to .075 times the basic amount to account for each districts' cost
of doing business, (i.e., adjusting the amount to include the higher
labor costs in urban districts).68 In order to determine the amount
of state funds each district needs to reach the basic aid level, the
state next calculates the amount the local districts should purported-
ly provide. The basis aid level is reduced by this "charge off,"
equal to 20 mills times the assessed valuation of property in the
school district.69
This system sounds simple enough, but a myriad of factors
converge in its calculation to create insufficient funds in some
districts and extravagant riches in others. The problems begin with
the 'cost of doing business' factor. By concentrating on labor costs,
this calculation assumes that all costs are lower in rural districts. 0
However, the costs of buying textbooks and materials, purchasing
insurance, and paying utility bills in rural districts are not lower
than they are in urban districts.71 Transporting construction materi-
als, mechanical parts, and service personnel can be even more
expensive." Second, the state mandates that each district provide
specific programs, such as special education, but does not fully
fund them. 3 Since each district receives a flat distribution per stu-
dent for these categorical programs, the burden of providing them
falls more harshly upon poor districts, which are forced to use all
their discretionary funds, or even go into debt, to provide these.
208. In the Youngstown City School District, curriculum is determined solely by state and
federal mandates. The district lacks the funds to offer any courses beyond the state mini-
mum requirements. Id. at 241.
65. The State admitted that the foundation program creates inequities. It merely assert-
ed that the program is not unconstitutional. Barry Kawa, Equitable School Funding Is Key
Issue, PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 15, 1994, Special Section at 9.
66. The current foundation program, although it bears the same name, is distinct from
the foundation program which the guaranteed yield formula replaced.
67. DeRolph v. State of Ohio, No. 22043 (Perry County. July 1, 1994) at 42.
68. Id at 42-43.
69. Id. at 42.
70. Id. at 43.
71. Id. at 69-70.
72. DeRolph v. State of Ohio, No. 22043 (Perry County, July 1, 1994) at 43.
73. Id. at 49-51.
[Vol. 45:679
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mandated programs.74
However, the major force driving some districts to ration toilet
paper" and enabling others to set up computer hookups with Rus-
sia76 is the foundation program's continued reliance on the proper-
ty tax. Wide gaps in property values necessarily create wide dispar-
ities in local millage.' In addition, Ohio law automatically reduc-
es any increase in property tax due to inflation, subject to a 20
mill floor.78 Therefore, if a district's property values increase
through inflation, the funds available to it from the state decrease
because the district's "charge-off' is higher. In reality though, the
district receives none of this "phantom revenue" from inflated
property values without passing an additional levy. In contrast, dis-
tricts experiencing rising property values through industrial develop-
ment or a housing boom do receive this increased revenue.79
These factors place property, and income poor districts in an
impossible position. In order to keep up with inflation, they must
pass levies, but these districts' low property values make the gains
from these levies negligible." Given their lack of disposable in-
come, residents of these districts find this burden more difficult to
meet and often refuse to meet it, exercising one of their few op-
portunities to directly reject a tax.' Meanwhile, poor districts fall
farther behind.
Seeking a judgment declaring this system unconstitutional, the
plaintiffs in DeRoIph v. State of Ohio brought suit, claiming, as the
plaintiffs did in Walter, that the funding system violated the "equal
protection and benefit" clause of article I, section 2 and the "thor-
ough and efficient" clause of article VI, section 2. The court's
opinion represents a victory for the plaintiffs on both grounds.
In its equal protection analysis, the court found education to be
a fundamental right deserving of strict scrutiny.8" After distin-
74. Id.
75. Id. at 257.
76. Id. at 475.
77. For example, one mill of property tax raised $22.08 per pupil in the Dawson-
Bryant School District in 1994. One mill of property tax in Upper Arlington, an affluent
Columbus suburb, raised $139.26 per pupil. Mike Curtin, School Issue an Old One: Solu-
tion for Ending Financial Disparities Elusive, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 3, 1994, at IA.
78. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 319.301 (Baldwin 1979).
79. DeRolph v. State of Ohio, No. 22043, (Perry County. July 1, 1994) at 55-58.
80. Id. at 61-66.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 469. Under a strict scrutiny analysis, the state can infringe upon the exercise
of a fundamental right only upon a showing that this infringement furthers a "compelling
689
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guishing DeRolph from Walter by characterizing DeRolph as a
"challenge to the way Ohio educates its children" rather than an
issue of taxation, the Court culled the right to education from
article I, sections 1, 2, and 7 of the Ohio Constitution.83 The court
directly linked the fundamentality of education to the "inalienable
rights" of "enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, pos-
sessing and protecting property and seeking and obtaining happi-
ness and safety" set forth in article I, section 1." The court em-
phasized that these rights are "severely restrained if not impossible
to meet" without a high quality education. 5 By linking education
to these rights, the court asserted that our definition of high quality
must grow as our "high-tech" economy advances.86
The Court also emphasized the traditional link between public
education and republican government. It echoed article I, sec-
tion 7's explicit language that "schools and the means of instruc-
tion" are essential to instill the "religion, morality, and knowledge"
necessary to good government."87 Although not directly stated, the
implicit assumption was that any institution so closely connected to
the effective workings of democracy must be fundamental to that
democracy.
Upon finding education to be a fundamental right, the court
found that the disparities in funding among districts deny plaintiffs
the "equal protection and benefit" of the law as guaranteed by
article I, section 2.8 The court linked the disparities in funding to
the lack of educational opportunity by citing evidence that "school
districts with expenditures in the top thirty percent have, by subject
matter, higher levels of students succeeding or passing the profi-
ciency tests and scoring satisfactorily on achievement scores."89
Additionally, the court found that the conditions these disparities
create, such as "buildings with asbestos dangers, out of date text-
books, overcrowded classrooms, and a lack of standard educational
equipment," effectively deprive plaintiffs of their fundamental right
to education.'
state interest." Id.
83. Id.
84. DeRolph v. State of Ohio, No. 22043 (Perry County July 1, 1994) at 469.
85. Id. at 468.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 469.
89. DeRolph v. State of Ohio, No. 22043 (Perry County July 1, 1994) at 468.
90. Id.
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The court then subjected the foundation program to strict scru-
tiny and found that the asserted state interest in "local control" was
not compelling. 9' Adopting the Walter test, the court held that
plaintiffs cannot "develop programs to meet perceived local needs."
Citing the plaintiffs' inability to make curriculum or policy changes
not mandated by the state, the court declared that "local control
without discretionary funds is a myth" and a "cruel illusion."'92
The court further found that the plaintiffs do not possess "local
control" merely because they have the "ability" to raise funding
through additional levies.93 Their poverty precludes this option.94
In addition, the court noted that the minor plaintiffs are "disenfran-
chised and have no ability to raise additional funds."'95
Next, the court tackled the article VI, section 2 claim by first
distinguishing Walter. The court correctly pointed out that the Wal-
ter court found the guaranteed yield program thorough and efficient
because all districts met certain "minimum standards." In contrast,
the DeRolph court stated that the current minimum standards are
not even being monitored. The court went on to cite the plaintiff
districts' failure to meet the ninth grade proficiency test standards
as evidence of the General Assembly's failure to provide "thorough
and efficient" schools.96 This is the weakest part of the opinion.
Given the complex relationship between funding per pupil and
student performance, the correlation between the proficiency tests
and the plaintiff school districts' lack of funds is attenuated.'
The court moved to stronger ground when it held that the state
funding system fails to meet the Miller test. As mentioned earlier,
Miller v. Korns stated that a "thorough system could not mean one
91. Id. at 469.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 470.
94. DeRolph v. State of Ohio, No. 22043 (Perry County, July 1, 1994) at 470.
95. Id. at 470.
96. Id. at 473.
97. See, e.g., Mary Beth Lane, Too Rich and Too Poor--Ohio School Dilemma, PLAIN
DEALER, July 3, 1994, at IA (citing a study by two Ohio University professors which
found that the 60 districts with the top proficiency test scores spent as little as $3,000
per pupil and as much as $11,000 while the 60 districts with the worst test scores spent
between $3,000 and $9,000 per pupil). This simple comparison of proficiency test scores,
however, misconstrues the nature of the DeRolph plaintiffs' claims. Because they operate
with insufficient funds, the plaintiff school districts cannot provide their students with
adequate special education programs or adequate gifted student programs. DeRolph. at 232-
41. Nor can they provide students with advanced courses necessary for college. Id. In
addition, their students are forced to undergo these deprivations, among others, in learning
environments that can only be described as Dickensian. Id. at 167-96.
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in which a part . . . of the school districts were starved for
funds."9' Nor could an "efficient system" mean one "in which
part . . . of the school districts lacked teachers, buildings, or equip-
ment." 99 The DeRolph court cited to its findings of fact to dem-
onstrate each plaintiff school districts' deficiencies in teachers,
buildings, and equipment."° As evidence of their financial need,
the court pointed out that some plaintiffs have gone into debt to
continue operating and that others "ration paper, [and] paper clips
and use out of date textbooks."''
The court also held that the operation of the school funding
system violates the plaintiffs' right to "uniform operation of the
laws" because of the vast disparities the system creates in educa-
tional opportunity. 2 The court specifically pointed to the arbi-
trary distributions of the State's wealth through the workings of
O.R.C. 319.301 which reduces inflationary increases in property
taxes. 0 3 Finally, the court made clear that the State, not the local
districts, is responsible for the creation of a thorough and efficient
system.
The State is obligated by law to produce a thorough and
efficient system of education for all students within the
state. To ensure that end, the state is likewise obligated to
provide sufficient funds to meet that requirement within the
constraints of the Ohio Constitution. This State's current
funding system which transfers major obligations for fund-
ing from the State to the local school districts does not
operate within those constraints."°
Pursuant to its decision, the court then ordered the Superinten-
dent of Public Instruction in Ohio to prepare a report containing
proposals "for the elimination of wealth-based disparities" in educa-
tion and to submit it to the Legislature."' The court further re-
quired the Ohio Department of Education to prepare a report set-
ting forth the legislative resolution of this issue and to submit it to
98. Miller v. Koms, 107 Ohio St. 287, 297 (1923).
99. Id. at 298.
100. DeRolph, at 475.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.; see also supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
104. DeRolph, at 476.
105. Id. at 478.
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the court after the 1994-1995 session."
III. ANALYSIS OF DEROLPH V. STATE OF OHIO
A. Distinguishing Board of Education v. Walter
Before an analysis of the DeRolph court's holdings, their valid-
ity in light of Walter must be determined. In DeRolph, the defen-
dants argued that Walter was "binding precedent upon the court
and res judicata to the issues" before it"°7. In its opinion, the
court rejected both of these arguments on three grounds. First, the
court pointed out that Walter determined the validity of the guar-
anteed yield program, not the current foundation program. Second,
the court stated that the individual plaintiffs in DeRolph were not
identical to those in Walter. Third, the court stated that several
issues before the DeRolph court, like the "revenue limiting impact
of [R.C. 319.301] and the funding of state mandated categorical
programs," were not at issue in Walter."8
As a matter of black-letter law, the DeRolph court was correct.
The syllabus of the Walter Court contained only the validation of
the statutes setting forth the guaranteed yield program and law not
in the supreme court's syllabus is dicta."° Therefore, Walter is
not binding precedent upon DeRolph. In addition, although the
DeRolph plaintiffs are arguably in privity with the Walter plaintiffs,
the funding systems distribute funds and create funding disparities
in different ways."'
Finally, as discussed in Part I, the Walter court did not address
whether education is a fundamental right. Instead, it redefined the
issue before it as a taxation issue.' Consequently, the DeRolph
court escaped Walter when it held that the issue before it is not
one "directly concerned" with the collection of taxes, but rather,
with the "way in which Ohio educates its children.""' Similarly,
106. Id.
107. Id. at 466.
108. Id.
109. See Haas v. State of Ohio, 103 Ohio St. 1, 8 (1921); State ex. rel Donahey v.
Edwardson, 89 Ohio St. 93, 107-8 (1913).
110. In fact, the guaranteed yield program, with its "bonus" for schools levying between
20 and 30 mills, is more generous than the foundation program. See supra note 21 for a
description of the guaranteed yield program. For a detailed description of the foundation
program, see supra notes 65-81 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
112. DeRolph v. State of Ohio, No. 22043 (Perry County, July 1, 1994) at 468 (quoting
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the Walter court's reliance on minimum standards, rather than
textual interpretation, to decide the article VI, section 2 issue al-
lowed DeRolph to escape its precedential value because the State
currently is not enforcing minimum standards."3 Only if one
reads Walter as establishing a standard of absolute deprivation does
it have any precedential effect upon DeRolph."4 However, not
only would this reading contradict the Walter court's use of the
Miller standard, it also would contradict any reasonable reading of
the "thorough and efficient" clause." 5 For these reasons, Board of
Education v. Walter was not binding precedent upon DeRolph v.
State of Ohio. Nor was the resolution of Walter res judicata to the
plaintiffs' claims in DeRolph.
B. Validity of the Equal Protection Claim
In analyzing the DeRolph court's equal protection holding, the
major issue for this Comment, as for the court, is whether the right
to an education is a fundamental right under the Ohio Constitution.
However, before reaching the fundamentality of education, the exis-
tence of this right, whether fundamental or not, must be deter-
mined. The DeRolph court grounded the right to education in
article I, section 1 and article I, section 7 of the Ohio Constitu-
tion." 6 To elucidate the existence and scope of this right, these
constitutional provisions shall be examined in turn.
In connecting the right to education to article I, section 1, the
court makes an argument essentially from individual economic
utility-namely, that the right to education is essential to achieve
the rights set forth in section 1' Although this constitutional
interpretation makes good policy, both the plain language of sec-
tion 1 and the history of its enforcement compel a contrary result.
First of all, section 1, as written, makes no mention of a govern-
mental obligation to further the rights set forth in it. In fact, "in-
alienable rights" are, by their very nature, inherent ones that re-
quire only the absence of state intrusions, rather than the exercise
of state intervention, to exist."8 The treatment of section 1 in
Board of Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 375-76 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1015 (1980)).
113. Id. at 466.
114. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
115. See infra notes 150-71 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
117. Id.
118. See JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 371 (Phillip Laslett ed.,
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Ohio courts supports this conclusion. Although the protection of
these rights has been historically enforced, no Ohio court has ever
placed*a "positive" obligation on the government to further these
rights."9
In connecting education to article I, section 7, the court makes
a fundamentally different argument. In Section 7, the court finds
language asserting the necessity of education in ensuring "good
government," an idea that forms the foundation of our republican
form of government. 20 American thought has long regarded edu-
cation as "essential to self-government.'' Both the founders of
the nation and the framers of the Ohio Constitution recognized that
education renders "the people the safe, as they are the ultimate,
guardians of their own liberty."'2 The early leaders of the public
school movement, as well, regarded this "republican" function of
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1967) ("[b]ut though Men when they enter into Society, give up
the Equality, Liberty, and Executive Power they had in the State of Nature, into the
hands of the Society, to be so far disposed of by the Legislature, as the food of the
Society shall require, yet it being only with an intention in every one the better to pre-
serve his Liberty and Property"); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT,
53 (Roger D. Masters ed. & Judith R. Masters trans., St. Martin's Press, 1978) (asserting
that people institute government to form "a sum of forces that can prevail" over the
obstacles to the exercise of natural rights).
119. OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION COMMISSION, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AMEND-
MENTS TO THE OHIO CONSTITUTION, PART II, 14 (1971) ("No Ohio case was found in
which this section alone was cited by a court as setting forth and enforceable right or
guarantee.").
120. See Kern Alexander, The Common School Ideal and Ihe Limits of Legislative Au-
thority, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGiS. 341, 347 (1991) (discussing the republican foundations of
the common school movement); Allen Hubsch, Education and Self Government: The Right
to Education Under State Constitutional Law, 18 J.L. & EDUC. 93, 94 (1989) (arguing
that the republican theory forms the basis of all state constitutional education clauses).
121. Hubsch, supra note 120, at 96.
122. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, quoted in A.E. Dick
Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA.
L. REV. 873, 917 (1976). See also, GEORGE WASHINGTON, THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES, quoted in L. CREMIN, THE
AMERICAN COMMON SCHOOLS: AN HISTORIC CONCEPTION 29 (1951) ("Promote then as an
object of primary importance, Institutions for the general diffusion of knowledge. In pro-
portion as the structure of a government gives force to public opinion, it is essential that
public opinion be enlightened."); DEBATES OF 1851 CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 14
(comments of Delegate Quigley concerning Ohio's duty to educate its children: "Intelli-
gence is the foundation-stone upon which the mighty Republic rests-its future destiny
depends upon the impulse, the action of the present generation .... ); id. at 11, 13
(comments of Delegate McCormick: "Educate them and they become useful members of
the community that has cared for them . . . . Education will tend to make men moral
and useful members of society; therefore, let us provide for the education of every child
in the state.").
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education as one of its most important.2 2 Although the plain lan-
guage of section 7 does not require but only "encourage[s] schools
and the means of instruction" to further the development of -"good
government,"'24 article VI, section 2 does place an affirmative
obligation upon the state to educate its citizens.2 5 When read to-
gether, these two constitutional provisions create a right to educa-
tion in Ohio to ensure a healthy and functioning government.
12 6
Whether the right to an education is fundamental is a closer
question. As the Walter court correctly recognized, fundamental
rights analysis appropriate for the Federal Constitution is inappro-
priate for state constitutions.' The Federal Constitution is one of
limited powers-the federal government can only do those things
explicitly or impliedly permitted in the document. In contrast, states
have plenary power; a state can do anything not prohibited by its
constitution or the Federal Constitution.128 In addition, state con-
stitutions, unlike the Federal Constitution, are easily and often
amended; they change with the changing values of the elector-
ate.129  State constitutional provisions are also more precise. 3°
Further complicating matters, states have often followed Jefferson's
advice to write a new constitution for every generation. Ohio, for
example, has had constitutional conventions in 1851, 1874, and
1912.' Therefore, while federal constitutional interpreters can
123. See HORACE MANN, LECTURES ON EDUCATION 55 (1850) ("Education must be
universal .... With us the qualification of voters is as important as the qualification of
governors, and even comes first in the natural order."); Calvin E. Stowe, Report on Ele-
mentary Public Instruction in Europe, Made to the Thirty-Sixth General Assembly of the
State of Ohio, Dec. 19, 1937, reprinted in CREMIN, supra note 122, at 75 ("[D]o not
patriotism and the necessity of self-preservation call upon us to do more and better for
the education of our whole people than any despotic sovereign can do for his.").
124. OHIO CONST. art. I, § 7.
125. See infra notes 150-71 and accompanying text.
126. In concert with these two provisions, article I, section 1 can be regarded as con-
templating a right to an education to the extent that the political well-being of the state
depends on its economic strength, which is in turn dependent on an educated citizenry.
127. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
128. William E. Thro, Note, To Render Then Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional
Provisions in Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. REV. 1639, 1656-7
(1989).
129. See Howard, supra note 122, at 939.
130. See, e.g., Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 169, 196 (1983).
131. See generally DEBATES OF 1.851 CONVENTION, supra note 1; PROCEEDINGS AND
DEBATES OF THE THIRD CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF OHIO (J.G. Adel, rep. 1874);
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF
OHIO (C.B. Galbreath, sec. 1912).
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look to the "framers;" interpreters of state constitutions must first
ask, "which framers?"'
32
Though the concept of fundamentality in state constitutional
interpretation presents problems, state constitutions, beyond ques-
tion, contain fundamental rights. 133 How then does one distinguish
provisions embodying fundamental rights from provisions that do
not? First of all, given the mutability of state constitutions, a
search for the fundamental is arguably the search for the immuta-
ble, those provisions present at the creation of the constitution
which have not passed into irrelevancy."x Although some argue
that more recent provisions better reveal the "felt needs of each
generation,"' 3 those provisions also tend to be time-bound.'36
The second inquiry corresponds to the first. The one constant
among the widely variable state constitutions is the inclusion of a
bill of rights. 137 Provisions found there should carry a greater pre-
sumption of fundamentality than those found in articles more con-
cerned with the delegation of power. Finally, a provision prevalent
in other state constitutions and the Federal Constitution should
carry a greater presumption of fundamentality than a provision
peculiar to one state constitution. This prevalence establishes a
close connection between the provision and something fundamental
132. Sanford Levinson, Interpreting the State Constitution by Resort to the Record, 6
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 567, 569 (1976).
133. In fact, the framers of the Federal Constitution developed the Bill of Rights from
the original state constitutions, Kenneth R. Bowling, "A Tub to the Whale:" The Adoption
of the Bill of Rights, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE STATES, 49 (Patrick P. Conley &
John P. Kaminski eds., 1992) and up through the 19th century, state constitutions were
the primary defenders of individual rights. Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in
State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1195, 1199-211 (1985). Such a central position
for state constitutions should not be surprising. In theory, the plenary powers of the states
pose a more direct threat to individual liberties than the limited powers of the Federal
Constitution. In this sense, state constitutions are the most appropriate place for funda-
mental rights.
134. See ROBERT DISHMAN, THE SHAPE OF THE DOCUMENT 40 (1968) for a discussion
of irrelevancy in state constitutions. See also Frank Grad, The State Constitution: Its
Function and Form for Our Time, 54 VA. L. REV. 928, 949-50 (1968) (arguing that fun-
damental provisions qualifying for inclusion in state constitutions must be "so important
and enduring" as to justify placing them in an "area beyond change by normal law-mak-
ing processes").
135. Howard, supra note 122, at 940.
136. For example, one of the most hotly debated issues at the 1851 Ohio Constitutional
Convention, and a major reason for calling it, was the constitutionality of granting of
corporate charters to private businesses. It was this issue, not the general right to equal
protection, that drew the majority of attention in the drafting of article I, section 2. See
DEBATES OF 1851 CONVENTION, supra note 1, at vol. II, 486-512.
137. DISHMAN, supra note 134, at 6.
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to our system of government. 138
Applying these criteria to DeRolph, the right to education is a
fundamental right under the Ohio Constitution. First, the right to
education contained in article I, section 7 has been present in some
form in every document granting sovereign authority to Ohio. The
Ordinance of 1787, which established the system of governance for
the Northwest Territory, encoded language essentially identical to
article I, section 7 concerning education.139 The Constitution of
1802 repeated this language in its article VIII, section 3 and stated
in article VIII, section 25 that "the doors of [ ] schools ... shall
be open for the reception of scholars, students and teachers, of
every grade, without any distinction or preference whatever."'"
Finally, the Constitution of 1851 fixed article I, section 7 and
article VI, section 2 in their present form. 4'
In addition, the substantive guarantee of the right to an educa-
tion finds its source in article I, section 7, a provision of the Bill
of Rights. 4 2 Although article VI, section 2 grants the state the
authority to establish a system of education, article I, section 7
provides the purpose behind the grant. Finally, all fifty state consti-
tutions contain amendments similar to article VI, section 22"
Therefore, the states have uniformly recognized their obligation, as
republican governments, to educate their citizens. These factors,
along with the historical connection between education and self-
government, render the right to an education a fundamental right
under the Ohio Constitution.
The status of education as a fundamental right, then, invokes
the strict scrutiny of the foundation program. Under such scrutiny,
DeRolph correctly invalidated the program. Although the local
control is, and has historically been, an important interest of the
state, the evidence before the court demonstrated that the funding
138. See Hubsch, supra note 120, at 95; see also Grad, supra note 134, at 951 ("One
value which may weigh heavily . . . is the significance of the provision for effective
government.").
139. "Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government and the
happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged."
ORDINANCE OF 1797, reprinted in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. App. (Baldwin 1979).
140. CONSTITUTION OF 1802, reprinted in DEBATES OF 1851 CONVENTION, supra note 1,
at vol. I. 11-12.
141. DEBATES OF 1851 CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 3552.
142. The provisions in article I of the Ohio Constitution constitute Ohio's Bill of
Rights.
143. See Hubsch, supra note 120, at 142-48 for a listing of these provisions.
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system actually precluded the DeRolph plaintiffs from exercising
such control.'" The poverty of their districts makes the passage
of levies difficult and the low value of their property renders those
levies ineffectual.'45  Finally, the arbitrary effects of O.R.C.
319.301 in restricting inflationary increases in property values calls
into question even the rational basis for the foundation pro-
gram.14
6
In sum, the DeRolph court correctly held that Ohio's current
funding system violates the "equal protection and benefit" clause of
article I, section 2. First, article I, sections 1 and 7 clearly establish
the existence of a right to education in the Ohio Constitution.
147
Second, the long history of these provisions and their embodiment
of the republican tenet that education is an essential attribute of a
democracy establish the fundamentality of this right.4 Because
the current funding system does not allow, but actually precludes
some school districts from exercising meaningful local control, the
system violates the "equal protection and benefit" clause because it
infringes upon the fundamental right to an education for no com-
pelling state interest.
49
C. Validity of the "Thorough and Efficient" Claim.
In its findings of fact, the DeRolph court conclusively demon-
strated that the plaintiff school districts lacked sufficient numbers
of teachers, buildings, and equipment.' Therefore, this analysis
will focus on whether DeRolph correctly construed the state's obli-
gation under article VI, section 2. In order determine this, this
portion of the Comment will focus on: 1) the plain meaning of the
"thorough and efficient" clause; 2) the framers' intent in adopting
it, and 3) the history of school funding in Ohio.
When interpreting legislative documents such as constitutional
provisions, it is important to look first to the clear language of the
document.'' The language of article VI, section 2 lends strong
support to the DeRolph court's interpretation of the provision. Sec-
tion 2 states that the General Assembly "shall make such provi-
144. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 75-81, 91-95 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 116-26 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 127-43 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
151. See Williams, supra note 130, at 196; Levinson, supra note 132, at 568.
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sions ... as ... secure a thorough and efficient system of com-
mon schools throughout the state."'15  This language denotes not
only a duty to fund schools, but also a duty to provide sufficient
funds to secure a high quality of public education throughout the
state. The use of "shall" places an "imperative"'53 duty upon the
state to create a state-wide funding system. The imperative "shall"
also endows the recipients of this obligation, the children of Ohio,
with a right to the enforcement of this imperative."5 Further, the
words "thorough" and "efficient" extend this duty to the creation
of a funding system that provides schools which are "complete or
perfect in all respects"' 5  and which "perform[ ] or function[ ] in
the best possible and least wasteful manner."'5 6 Therefore, from
the plain meaning of article VI, section 2, the DeRolph court's
ruling seems unassailable.
The legislative intent behind the drafting of section 2 also
lends credence to the view that the provision is not simply a grant
of discretionary power.5 7 The remarks of the drafters of section 2
at the 1851 Constitutional Convention reveal an intent to see the
schools "grow with the growth, and strengthen with the strength of
the state. ""' The delegates also repeatedly warned of the harm
to the state if a "permanent and efficient system of education"
were not established.' Most importantly, the delegates conceived
of education not just as a benefit to the state, but as the right of
the children. As Delegate Curry stated: "In my opinion, the great
152. OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2.
153. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 958 (6th ed. 1990).
154. Id. at 348. ("[un jurisprudence, [a duty] is a correlative of right.").
155. RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1367 (rev. ed. 1988).
156. Id. at 421.
157. Interestingly enough, the West Virginia Supreme Court has already come to this
conclusion. In Pauley v. Kelley, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979), the West Virginia re-
viewed the legislative history of article VI, section 2 in order to determine the meaning
of its own "thorough and efficient" clause, W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § I, which it had
borrowed from Ohio. The West Virginia Court determined that "the tenor of the discus-
sion [ ] by those advocating the entire education as it was finally adopted, leaves no
doubt that excellence was the goal, rather than mediocrity," Pailey at 867, and partly on
this finding, declared its school funding system unconstitutional.
158. DEBATES OF 1851 CONVENTION, supra note 1, at vol. II, 711 (remarks of Delegate
Reemlin.)
159. Id. at 15 (remarks of Delegate McCormick.); id. at 13 (remarks of Delegate Bates:
"[T]he state would materially suffer if a provision to exclude any class of children from
the benefits of common schools should be engrafted in the new Constitution."); id. at 11
(remarks of Delegate Taylor: "I think it must be clear to every reflecting mind that the
true policy of the statesman is to provide the means of education, and consequent moral
improvement, to every child in the state.").
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object to be attained is a system of education, general and com-
plete, which shall extend its advantages to all the children of the
State, and afford to each an opportunity to secure all the benefits
which it affords."'"
Admittedly, the historical reality of school funding in Ohio has
often belied both the language and intent of article VI, sec-
tion 2.16 The Walter court was correct in stating that this history
was one of local control" and often inadequate funding. Howev-
er, history also reveals that this reliance upon property tax was
based on economic assumptions which no longer have relevance in
today's society. The source of Ohio's reliance upon the property
tax is the Land Ordinance of 1785, which ceded the sixteenth
section of every township to the support of education upon Ohio's
admission to the Union.'63 From its early reliance on the income
from these lands, Ohio developed its system of school funding
through 'the taxation of property." As long as Ohio remained a
largely rural state, land formed the major asset for Ohio's popula-
tion and its major source of income.65 Therefore, the funding
system made sense. However, Thomas Jefferson authored the Land
Ordinance of 1785 on the assumption that Ohio, and the other new
states, would remain rural and agricultural in nature."
160. Id. at 710.
161. See GEORGE KNEPPER, OHIO AND ITS PEOPLE 185 (1989) ("There was an enor-
mous gap between the dream of an educated citizenry and the reality."); EDWARD A.
MILLER, HISTORY OF EDUCATIONAL LEGISLATION IN OHIO: 1803-1850, at 114-18 (Arno
Press 1969) ("The traditions of Ohio were from the first against centralization.").
162. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
163. See CREMIN, supra note 122, at 119 (citing JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CON-
GRESS. XXVII, 378).
164. Id. at 122-25; see also MILLER, supra note 161, at 6-10.
165. See KNEPPER, supra note 161, at 117-36; Interestingly enough, the facts of Miller
v. Korns reflect this first demographic shift:
"In the attainment of the purpose of establishing an efficient and thorough
system of schools throughout the state it was easily conceivable that the great-
est expense might arise in the poorest districts ...while districts underpopulat-
ed with children might represent such taxation value that their school needs
would be relatively over supplied . . . .Presumably, the instant law was drawn
to meet just such a situation."
Miller v. Korns, 107 Ohio St. 287, 298 (1923).
166. STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 199 (1993) (as-
serting that Notes on the State of Virginia, along with his various legislative proposals, re-
veals Jefferson's conviction that "the United States ought to remain a rural nation");
CALEB P. PATI'ERSON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 171
(1971) (linking the Land Ordinance of 1785 to Jefferson's belief in a "republics of the
farm").
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Unfortunately, Jefferson's predictions proved wrong. Since the
turn of the century, Ohio has become almost completely urban-
ized. 167 With this urbanization, the rough equality of the frontier
farmers disappeared, and income became the function of employ-
ment, not land. However, because cities formed around certain
economic functions, these early urban areas at least required the
presence of citizens from different social strata. 18 It has been the
creation of suburban communities that has proved most detrimental
to the purposes of article VI, section 2. As communities based on
income rather than economic function, the suburbs hopelessly
skewed the distribution of school funds through property
taxation. 69 Therefore, although history demonstrates the longevity
of school funding through property taxation, it also demonstrates its
irrelevance.
The DeRolph court correctly held that the present funding
system violated the "thorough and efficient" clause of article VI,
section 2. The clear language of the provision and the intent of its
framers demonstrate that the state has an affirmative obligation to
secure a high quality education for every public school student in
Ohio.7' The history of school funding in Ohio further demon-
strates the inappropriateness of continued funding of schools
through local property taxation.'
IV. CONCLUSION
In DeRolph v. State of Ohio, the court correctly held that
Ohio's current funding system violates the "equal protection and
benefit" clause of article I, section 2 and the "thorough and effi-
cient" clause of article VI, section 2. Both the founders of our
country and the framers of the Ohio Constitution recognized that
education is fundamental to our society. Not only does an adequate
education prepare citizens to take part in the democratic process, it
ensures the state of a population capable of maintaining a strong
167. See KNEPPER, supra note 161, at 313-47.
168. Id.
169. See Alexander, supra note 120, at 348 (asserting that "[a] sense of solidarity and
community based on economic condition is formed around shall, affluent school districts"
and that the interests of the parents in these districts are "insular" and "driven toward two
primary objectives: maintaining the educational advantage for their children and a near
obsessive concern with maintaining or upgrading property values" (citations omitted)).
170. See supra notes 150-60 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 161-69 and accompanying text.
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middle class, the foundation of every healthy democracy."'
Equally clear is the duty of Ohio to provide this education.
The strength of DeRolph lies in its recognition that the drafters of
article VI, section 2 intended to establish a system of education,
not a system of funding. They expected the educational system to
grow to meet the needs of a changing society, not stagnate to
conform to an outmoded means of taxation.
Governor Voinovich has stated that "one southern Ohio judge"
should not determine the fate of Ohio's school funding system.'
The Governor has it wrong. Judge Lewis did not determine the
fate of school funding; he enforced the Ohio Constitution. This
author hopes that the State will do the same.
MoRRIs L. HAWK
172. See supra note 126.
173. Jonathan Riskind, State to Appeal School Funding Ruling, COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
August 13, 1994, at 1C.
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